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at least—than that of Milton or of Shakespeare.” They are more choice: they are not so “staled and rung upon in common discourse.” There can be little doubt that the choicest name in modern philosophy is that of Spinoza. He can hardly ever be vulgarized, as even Kant or Hegel may. Perhaps it is partly for this reason that he is the object of a warmer devotion than any other. He is as well named *Benedictus* as the apostle of “God, Freedom, and Immortality” was named *Immanuel*. He is the one philosopher who is not followed, but who is loved and worshipped. The present edition is an illustration of this fact. It is evident that it is work of one for whom, as for Goethe or Shelley, Spinoza is much more than an expositor of metaphysic. He is a believer in the Spinozistic life, as there used to be believers in the Parmenidean. For though Spinoza is sometimes claimed as an advocate of the view that philosophy is a mere study of truth, with no bearing on practice, there is in reality none who serves better to refute that view. He is one of those with whom the philosophic and the prophetic are most finely blended. Mr. White’s appreciation of this gives an interest to his edition.* While he has a quite competent understanding of Spinoza’s theoretic position, and of his relations to other philosophers, he adds an insight into the Spinozistic spirit. His translation is probably the best that has yet been made, and altogether the edition is one that deserves to be warmly welcomed. The new preface is a solid and valuable piece of work. It is a pity that it does not contain fuller references to the Spinozistic literature, at least in this country. Perhaps, when another edition is called for, some reference of this sort may be added.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

LA SCIENZA DELL’ EDUCAZIONE. Di Roberto Ardigo. Verona : Fratelli Drucker, 1893.

The readers of this little book may be interested to learn something of its author. Professor Ardigo was formerly a priest, a learned canon of Mantua, his native city. One fine day he was inspired with the desire to defend ancient philosophy and faith against the impious attacks of modern criticism. But, like St. Paul on the way to Damascus, he was dazzled by so brilliant a light that

* Cf. also, for an appreciation of Spinoza from this point of view, Delbos’s “Le Problème Moral dans la Philosophie de Spinoza” and Brunschvigg’s “Spinoza.”

when he recovered he found himself a convert to that very science which he strove to controvert. He threw off his frock and devoted himself henceforth to study and teaching. From the royal lyceum of Mantua he was transferred to the University by means of the boldness of one of the ministers, Dr. Baccelli, who had him nominated, in 1881, Professor of the History of Philosophy at the University of Padua. Here he also had charge of the department of Pedagogy for two years. The book here presented is made up of lectures given in these two years and collected and published by his scholars.

If Ardigo surrenders to modern science and to modern Positivism, he does so with discretion, for he has an irresistible tendency to an independent judgment of his own, and his equipment of philosophic study is greater than that of many eminent positivists. He has carefully studied the Patristic writers and knows St. Thomas thoroughly. Nothing therefore can be further from the truth than to assume, as many have, that this Italian philosopher is a close follower of Spencer, whereas he does not follow any one, and has his own ideas and philosophic system. There are, indeed, many points on which he is not in accord with the doctrines ordinarily held by contemporary Positivists. If this were not borne out by his numerous books,* it would be proved by this course of lectures on Pedagogy, which is purely the outcome of his scientific activity, and differs most completely from any other treatment of the subject, as will be seen in the brief *résumé* here presented.

In the introduction, the author distinguishes pedagogical doctrines from Pedagogy and pedagogical science, which is a *complexus of rules deduced from principles*. Pedagogy is a science of the facts of education, which facts, being distinct from all others, may well be the object of scientific study (p. 10). In order to know how the facts of education are obtained we need to study its constituent parts, which he enumerates as follows: 1. Activity; 2. Exercise; 3. Habit; 4. Education. There can be no education if

* The principal publications of Ardigo are "La Psicologia come scienza positiva;" "La Formazione naturale nel fatto del sistema solare;" "La Morale dei positivisti;" "La Sociologia;" "Il Vero."

The following writings are also important: "Pietro Pomponazzi;" "L'Inconoscibile di H. Spencer;" "La Religione di T. Mamiani;" "La Studio della Storia della filosofia;" "La Relatività della Logica umana;" "La coscienza vecchia e le idee nuove;" "Empirismo e Scienza;" "Il fatto psicologico della percezione."

habits are not formed, no habit without exercise, no exercise without activity (p. 45).

Activity, in its general signification, is the condition which a body assumes by means of force communicated to it (p. 49). Through psychical activity this force becomes an external or internal stimulus which, being irritated, causes a consumption of cerebral-nervous substance, followed by sensation; this, however, must not be confounded with the former phenomena, which are purely physiological (p. 58). The author then goes on to speak of the effects of activity, and deduces practical applications that are of importance pedagogically, relating to the duration and variety of exercise, and to the necessity of keeping account of pleasure and pain (p. 87), to which subject he devotes a number of pages.

Proceeding to discuss the stimuli most adapted to develop mental activity, he arranges them in two classes,—general and special. General stimuli are intuition and speech. Special stimuli are those which need to be adapted to the state, the age, and the general condition of the pupil. The fundamental stimulus which calls forth the conscious activity of the child is the circle of things surrounding it. The merit of modern pedagogic science consists in having substituted the intuition of things for the words that represented them. The author points out the distinction between direct and indirect or symbolic intuition, and divides direct intuition into natural and artificial. The surroundings in which the individual is born and lives determine the natural direct intuition of which Nature, Art, and Society are the expression (p. 109). While “direct natural intuition” is that experience which every one can gain according to the circumstances in which he lives; “direct artificial intuition,” on the other hand, is that by means of which we can draw profit from the experience of others and of humanity as a whole (p. 119). The chief opportunity for getting this kind of intuition is the school, which serves as a means of adding the experience of mankind to that which each can attain for himself (p. 120).

Whenever, for the sake of instruction, it is necessary to have recourse to figures, drawings, tables, etc., then there is “indirect intuition,” which, like “direct intuition,” applies to all things, all science, all morality, all language. The chapters that treat of these three kinds of intuition, together with those which refer to general stimuli, namely, language and oral teaching, constitute the most important part of the book. I should mention as of special interest

those pages which deal with the exemplification of the abstract, abbreviation, and anticipation wherein the author is in agreement with Comte, and the consideration he accords to the social factor in education. In the following chapters on methods (pp. 247-273), the author concedes to the deductive method its legitimate position.

Passing to "Exercise," which takes up the second part of the book, the author considers its effects in special chapters entitled: (1) exercise strengthens the organs; (2) removes injurious impediments from the organs; (3) renders them more energetic; (4) produces new connections and new contact between the organs; (5) makes the organic automatic; (6) creates and develops the organ by adaptation; (7) forms the will.

In speaking of the will, the author reaffirms the doctrine set forth in his other writings. "It is a mistake," he says, "to believe that the will precedes organic motion. If I lift my arm by an act of my will, it might be thought that the psychic act of willing comes first, and then the physiological fact of raising my arm. The fact is precisely the opposite. It would be strange if one were to say that a pain in the abdomen precedes an irritation of the intestines. In one word, the sense of will, like all the other senses, takes place after the relative organic irritation (p. 344), and is a product, an effect of the activity of a special organ. In like manner the senses of sight and hearing are dependent on the activity of special organs." This is followed by some important chapters treating of the development of the will from an educational point of view. If, indeed, the education of the will is dependent on the *exercise* of the will, then we can appreciate the indignant protest of the author to the views of those who assert that all education depends on the number of cognitions that are acquired. Instead of this, he desires the pupil willingly to perform many and varied exercises, to become accustomed to laying great stress on the approval of his comrades, that he be accustomed to hygienic precautions, that the body be inured to fatigue and physical endurance, that the pupil learn to appreciate the practical necessities of life and understand the economic means for sustaining it.

The true value of "exercise" is to be found in the acquisition of "habits." By means of habits "education" is attained. This is the subject of the rest of the book. Since these two are interdependent, the author devotes the third part of his book solely to the consideration of habit, treating of it in seven chapters: 1. Re-

flex Action. 2. Energy. 3. Inhibition. 4. Will. 5. Attention. 6. Instinct. 7. Habit.

In the explanation of the formation of habit, concludes the author, is demonstrated how and why it is the central fact of education, and for the very simple reason that education itself is nothing more nor less than habit. For what may be said to constitute education? Not merely the simple enumeration of things to be learned, but rather that exercise which produces the intellectual habit and that second nature by which the crude and incomplete man, as yet uneducated, is perfected. But if education is habit, it does not follow that any kind of habit may be called education. Education means only good and improving habits.

This *résumé* can give but a faint reflection of the contents of a book that treats the subject in an entirely novel manner, and that contains philosophic theories that cannot be passed by without careful thought.

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THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS. By Thomas Fowler, D.D., President of Corpus Christi College, and sometime Wykeham Professor of Logic in the University of Oxford, and John Matthias Wilson, B.D., late President of Corpus Christi College, and sometime Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Oxford. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1894. Pp. xxi., 138; ii., 370.

This is simply a reprint, in a single volume, of the work previously issued in two. It contains, however, a number of corrections and improvements not embodied in the text, but given separately on pp. vii.-xii. It also contains a new preface. The work itself is too well known to require any special notice here.

J. S. M.

SCIENCE AND CHRISTIAN TRADITION. Essays by T. H. Huxley (Vol. V. of the Collected Essays). London: Macmillan & Co., 1894.

I think that to most readers of this JOURNAL Mr. Huxley's republished controversies will retain, in their controversial aspect, but little interest. Yet they are brilliantly written, and the essay on the "Value of Witness to the Miraculous" is a remarkable study of some mediæval minds. But the question for most of us